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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Appellee accepts the appellant's Statement of 
Jurisdiction. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(3)(a) states as follows: 
The benefits payable to any injured person 
under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by: (a) 
any benefits which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this code under any workers' 
compensation or similar statutory plan. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Billie Peterson filed a complaint for 
declaratory judgment. He sought a declaration from the court 
as to the amount of wage loss benefits he was entitled to 
receive as no-fault benefits from defendant The Allstate 
Insurance Company. The Allstate Insurance Company had refused 
to pay any benefits for lost income because Mr. Peterson had 
been paid workers compensation wage loss benefits of $377.00 
per week, which exceeded the maximum of $250 that Allstate's 
policy provided for wage loss benefits. 
Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment and asked 
the trial court to declare that it did not owe Mr. Peterson 
any money for his lost income. Judge Glen Dawson granted the 
motion and ruled no wage loss benefits were owed. Judge 
Dawson reserved ruling on whether Allstate owed benefits for 
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loss of household services. A stipulation was entered by the 
parties that Allstate had paid all benefits owed for lost 
household services under the policy. A final order of 
dismissal with prejudice and on the merits was then entered by 
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was injured in 
a motor vehicle accident. (T.R. pp. 11, 19, 32.) 
2. At the time of the accident, Mr. Peterson was 
traveling as a passenger in a private truck being driven by a 
co-employee. (T.R. pp. 12, 19, 32.) 
3. At the time of the accident, Mr. Peterson was being 
paid for his travel time by his employer. (T.R. pp. 12, 19.) 
4. The co-employee's truck was insured by the Allstate 
Insurance Company. (T.R. pp. 12, 19.) 
5. Mr. Peterson was paid temporary total disability 
workers compensation benefits for his injuries in the sum of 
$377.00 per week, based on his income. (T.R. pp. 12, 17, 19.) 
6. The Allstate policy provided for personal injury 
protection (PIP no-fault benefits) to be paid to Mr. Peterson, 
a passenger in the insured vehicle. (T.R. pp. 12, 19.) 
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7. The Allstate policy provided up to the statutorily 
required $250.00 per week for lost income pursuant to the PIP 
section of its policy. (T.R. pp. 12, 19.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Billie Peterson is entitled to receive up to $250.00 per 
week in PIP lost wages benefits. Utah Code Annotated § 31A-
22-309(3)(a) states that this sum is reduced by the $377.00 
Mr. Peterson received as workers compensation benefits. A 
court should apply this statute pursuant to its ordinary 
meaning. The only two Utah decisions that discuss the statute 
impliedly authorize a reduction. The two decisions from 
Florida cited by the appellant are based on a review of a 
different statute. The relief Mr. Peterson seeks must be by a 
legislative enactment and not by a judicial reworking of a 
clear, enforceable and unamibiguous statute. 
ARGUMENT 
The question before this Court is how much a worker who 
is injured in an automobile accident should receive in PIP 
benefits after he is paid workers compensation benefits. The 
Utah legislature answered this question when it enacted Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(3)(a). That section states that 
benefits payable to any injured person under § 31A-22-307, 
which is entitled "personal injury protection coverages and 
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benefits," and includes in (b)(1), reimbursement for lost 
wages at the rate of the lesser of $250.00 per week or 85% of 
any loss of gross income, "are reduced by" any benefits which 
the injured person receives under any worker(s) compensation 
plan. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that 
its principle duty in interpreting a statute is to determine 
the legislature's intent, and the best evidence of legislative 
intent is the plain language of the statute. In reading the 
plain language the court gives effect to each term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 
922, 925 (Utah 1995) (citing Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of 
Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993) and Versluis v. Guaranty 
Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). 
The ordinary and accepted meaning of the word "reduce" is 
to diminish in size, amount, extent or number. Webster's 
Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, 
copyright 1989 by Portland House. The only way to give effect 
to the word "reduce," as used in Utah Code Annotated section 
31A-22-309(3)(a), is to diminish in amount the $250.00 per 
week provided by Utah Code Annotated section 
31A-22-307(l)(b)(1), by the $377.00 paid to Mr. Peterson 
through the workers compensation act. In the factual scenario 
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in this case this reduces the sum of $250.00 to zero. To do 
anything else would not give "reduce" its ordinary and accepted 
meaning and would therefore destroy the legislative intent 
behind the PIP statute. 
Billie Peterson argues that the Utah courts have never 
specified the method of benefit calculation when an injured 
person seeks PIP benefits after being paid workers 
compensation benefits. Allstate agrees that this is an issue 
of first impression with the Utah courts, but asserts that the 
Utah legislature has specifically addressed this issue when it 
enacted § 31A-22-309(3)(a). As such, if this issue needs to 
be addressed it will be done in this case, however, there has 
been no need for a court to address this issue as it has been 
conclusively decided by the Utah legislature. 
The two Utah court decisions that have application to the 
issue at hand are the cases cited in Peterson's brief, Neel v. 
State, supra, and Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Neel v. State, the issue was whether 
the State of Utah, as a self-insurer of its own vehicles, had 
an obligation to pay both workers compensation benefits and 
PIP benefits when an employee was injured in an auto accident 
while on the job. The State had refused to pay any PIP 
benefits. In reaching its decision, the Utah Supreme Court 
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reversed its then 15-year-old decision in IML Freight, Inc. v. 
Ottosen. 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975), and held that the payment 
of workers compensation benefits was not a complete bar to the 
subsequent recovery of PIP benefits. The court examined Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(3)(a) and held that the use of 
word "reduced" meant that a person could receive both PIP 
benefits and workers compensation benefits. However, the 
court noted that the statute permits a no-fault insurer to 
exclude "some liability" to pay benefits, specifically PIP 
benefits which were already paid as workers compensation. The 
court noted that a PIP insurer has no absolute defense, but 
may receive a credit for compensation payments which the 
injured worker had already received. The court then concluded 
its opinion stating at 926 as follows: 
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers, are 
required to pay PIP benefits to injured 
employees to the extent those benefits exceed 
workers compensation benefits. 
Allstate is not claiming that Billie Peterson cannot 
receive both workers compensation and PIP benefits. Instead, 
it is Allstate's position that in this case the maximum PIP 
benefits allowed ($250) do not exceed the workers compensation 
benefits that were already paid ($377). 
In Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah 
App. 1990), the issue was exactly the opposite of the one in 
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this case, in that PIP benefits were first paid and then the 
employer sought a reduction of workers compensation benefits 
it was required to pay by statute. There is no analogous 
statute allowing such a reduction, therefore the Court did not 
allow the employer to take credit for the benefits already 
paid by the PIP insurer. In reviewing and interpreting Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(3)(a) the court noted that the 
legislature determined that between a no-fault insurer and 
workers compensation insurer, that the no-fault insurer does 
not bear the burden of paying benefits if workers' compensation 
benefits are already paid. The court stated that the no-fault 
insurer is permitted to exclude from coverage benefits that 
are already paid through the workers compensation plan. In 
fact, the court noted at footnote 7, p. 578 that is probable 
that the no-fault insurer would seek reimbursement of the 
funds it had already paid. 
Billie Peterson argues that this court should follow the 
example of the Florida appellate court decisions in Comeau v. 
Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 356 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1978) and 
Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 166 (Fla. App. 
1978) . The Florida appellate courts did address the issue of 
payment of both PIP and workers compensation benefits in these 
cases, but in doing so they relied on Florida statute 627.736. 
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The Florida statute is different from the Utah statute. It 
does not state that PIP benefits are reduced by workers 
compensation benefits, but instead states that workers 
compensation benefits shall be a credit against PIP benefits. 
The Florida courts noted that a credit does not necessarily 
reduce what is owed, but instead goes to the total amount of 
damages that will be paid to the injured person. As such they 
allowed no reduction, but instead allowed a stacking of PIP 
benefits on the prior paid workers compensation benefits. 
Billie Peterson's award of temporary disability was based 
on his average weekly wages. He was making approximately 
$1,721.00 per week, therefore his compensation rate was 
$377.00 per week. This exceeds the $250.00 maximum allowed as 
PIP benefits under the Allstate policy, but does not approach 
his pre-injury income. He argues that he will not be made 
whole by such payments, that there is therefore no duplication 
of benefits, and it is simply not fair for him to not receive 
more money as lost income. The Utah legislature provided two 
alternative statutory no-fault remedies for Mr. Peterson when 
they enacted the Workers Compensation Act and the Utah No-
Fault Act. The Utah No-Fault Act provides an immediate 
payment regardless of fault. The statute is clearly worded, 
enforceable and unambiguous. It however provides only 
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secondary backup payments in that it states in plain and 
simple language that any available PIP benefits will be 
reduced by what Mr. Peterson has already received as workers 
compensation benefits. It is not a court's role to rewrite 
this statute, to manipulate the language or construe the 
statute to give it a meaning other than as it is written, or 
to establish a non-enunciated legislative intent which would 
void the words of the statute. Instead, the trial court was 
mandated to enforce the statute as enacted. 
Billie Peterson argues that a public policy that all 
injured people be made whole should override the legislative 
enactment. The legislature considers what is best for the 
public when it enacts laws. To change this legislative 
enactment, Mr. Peterson should not seek a remedy through the 
courts, but instead his forum is in the Utah State 
Legislature. Allstate at many times has sought relief from 
the courts because it felt the legislature passed a statute 
that is not in the best interests of Allstate and the public 
at large. In doing so, they have often argued that public 
policy considerations should cause the courts to rewrite 
statutes. However, as Justice Russon told Allstate in Larson 
v Allstate, 857 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993) at 266, fn. 3: 
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(Lastly, Allstate raises several policy 
considerations . . . However,) since it is the 
judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the 
legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the 
law as it sees fit, such arguments are better 
saved for the legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
Allstate seeks an order from this Court affirming the 
trial court declaration that Allstate does not owe PIP lost 
income benefits to Billie Peterson. 
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